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The ISO 9000 series of quality management systems standards, introduced in 1986, has been adopted atover 560,000 locations worldwide. Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms can achieve internal benefits
such as quality or productivity improvements or that certification can help firms maintain or increase their
market share, or both. Others argue that the standard is too generic to cause performance improvement but
can be seen as a signal of good management. In this paper, we track financial performance from 1987 to 1997
of all publicly traded ISO 9000 certified manufacturing firms in the United States with SIC codes 2000–3999,
and test whether ISO 9000 certification leads to productivity improvements, market benefits, and improved
financial performance. We employ event-study methods, matching each certified firm to a control group of one
or more noncertified firms in the same industry with similar precertification size and/or return on assets. We
find that firms’ decision to seek their first ISO 9000 certification was indeed followed by significant abnormal
improvements in financial performance, though the exact timing and magnitude of this effect depend on the
specification of the control group. Three years after certification, the certified firms do display strongly significant
abnormal performance under all control-group specifications. The degree to which the precise results vary across
control-group specifications indicates that event studies should always include extensive sensitivity analysis,
for instance matching by size and performance separately and jointly, using both single firms and portfolios as
controls.
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1. Introduction
The ISO 9000 series of quality management systems
standards is an exceptionally widely diffused manage-
ment practice. By December 2001, it had been adopted
by over 560,000 facilities in 159 countries; over 38,000
of those facilities are located in the United States
(ISO 2003). Despite this, considerable uncertainty
exists among practitioners and scholars about the true
effects of the standard, given its generic and mini-
mally prescriptive nature. Reimann and Hertz (1994)
explain ISO 9000’s focus on conformance and how
it differs from the Baldrige award’s much broader
focus on competitiveness. Moreover, implementing
ISO 9000 is not without cost. Besides the fees for
auditors and consultants, the process generally con-
sumes considerable employee time and effort. Espe-
cially as ISO 9000 was the first standard of its type,
many firms had to develop, implement, and docu-
ment their quality management system from scratch.
Remarkably, though, there is no hard evidence to
date on the financial effects of ISO 9000 certification.
Landmark studies by Hendricks and Singhal (1997)
and Easton and Jarrell (1998) show that total qual-
ity management (TQM) leads to improved financial
performance, but the philosophy underlying TQM is
quite different from (though not inconsistent with)
that of ISO 9000. TQM is a loosely defined, holistic
set of principles and tools aimed at, among others,
encouraging continuous improvement and prevention
of defects; the premise of ISO 9000 is that well
defined and documented procedures improve consis-
tency of output. Degree of TQM implementation is
difficult to assess objectively: Hendricks and Singhal
(1997) use quality awards to signal the presence of an
effective TQM program, and Hendricks and Singhal
(2001b) find that the exact nature of the quality award
influences the extent to which recipient firms ben-
efit from it. Easton and Jarrell (1998) use in-depth
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questionnaires to assess degree of TQM implemen-
tation. ISO 9000 certification, on the other hand, is
unambiguous, due to the third-party audits involved.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some firms truly
take the underlying principles of the ISO 9000 stan-
dards to heart, while others only do the mini-
mum necessary to pass the audits. Indeed, Andrews
et al. (2001) find noticeable differences beween audi-
tors’ interpretations of the ISO 14001 standards, the
environmental management systems counterpart to
ISO 9000. Some of the areas of variation were specific
to ISO 14001, while others are likely to apply equally
to ISO 9000, such as variations in auditor training and
experience. In this study, we focus only on the effects
of certification, ignoring the depth of implementation.
Most scholarly work so far on the benefits of
ISO 9000 has relied on surveys; certified firms often
claim to have obtained benefits from adopting ISO
9000, but these benefits are self-reported. In this paper,
we combine Compustat data with a database of all
ISO 9000 certifications in the United States in the
manufacturing sector, with SIC codes 2000–3999. The
result is a database of 7,238 firms for the 1987–1997
period. We perform a range of sensitivity analyses
to explore the impact of different matching meth-
ods. We match certified firms to individual noncerti-
fied firms and to control groups of noncertified firms.
We use several criteria to select control firms: pre-
certification size, return on assets, and both. We use
various parametric and nonparametric test statistics.
In all cases, we find that three years after their first
certification, firms experienced strongly significant
abnormal performance, though the exact timing and
magnitude of the effects vary with different control-
group specifications.
In §2, we review relevant literature related to ISO
9000 and TQM. Section 3 develops the theoretical rela-
tionships between ISO 9000 certification and financial
performance. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5
describes the event-study methods used and presents
our main results. We discuss these and our sensitiv-
ity analysis in §6. Section 7 offers our conclusions and
suggestions for future research.
2. Literature
In this section we review literature on ISO 9000 certifi-
cation and on TQM. Most literature on ISO 9000 either
focuses on adoption or uses self-reported survey-
based performance measures. Surveys by Terziovski
et al. (1997) and Singels et al. (2001) find no link
between ISO 9000 and organizational performance
among Australian and Dutch firms, respectively,
though Terziovski et al. (2003) do find that higher
reported business performance is positively associ-
ated with a broader set of motivations for seeking
ISO 9000 certification. Casadesús et al. (2001) find that
Basque companies report substantial operational and
financial benefits from certification.
Using Compustat data, Anderson et al. (1999) find
that U.S. firms with higher exports to Europe are
more likely to seek ISO 9000 certification, and Corbett
(2004), using data from a multinational survey, finds
that exports drive early certifications; Guler et al.
(2000), Mendel (2001), and Corbett and Kirsch (2001)
examine drivers of global diffusion of ISO 9000 and
ISO 14000. Adams (1999) finds that ISO 9000 certifica-
tion in New Zealand increases with firm size, Tobin’s
Q, and market segmentation. Naveh and Marcus
(2004), using a detailed survey of ISO 9000 in the
United States, find that “going beyond” the require-
ments of the standard increases its value to the firm.
Terlaak and King (2005a) argue that ISO 9000 is a
signalling mechanism and finds sales growth that is
partly consistent with that view; Terlaak and King
(2005b) also find evidence that institutional theory
contributes to explaining adoption. King and Lenox
(2001) and Russo (2001) find some evidence that ISO
9000 and ISO 14000 certification respectively improve
firms’ environmental performance, suggesting that
both standards do also have an impact on production
practices.
Several authors have examined the financial effects
of implementing TQM programs. Hendricks and
Singhal (1996, 1997, 2001a) use event studies to show
that winning a quality award increases short-term
and long-term stock price and operating performance.
Hendricks and Singhal (2001b) find that the extent
of financial benefits arising from TQM depends on
firm characteristics and on the type of quality award
involved. The event studies in Easton and Jarrell
(1998) also show a significant improvement in per-
formance after implementing TQM. Powell (1995)
concludes that the tacit resources often associated
with successful TQM implementation improve perfor-
mance, rather than the TQM tools themselves. Ittner
et al. (2001) report that proactive investments in pre-
vention do lead to lower nonconformance quality
costs.
By contrast, very few authors have explicitly mea-
sured the financial effects of ISO 9000 certification.
Event studies by Lima et al. (2000) and Martínez-
Costa and Martínez-Lorente (2002) find no effects
in Brazil and Spain, respectively, while the Spanish
event study by Nicolau and Sellers (2002) only finds
a positive stock price effect on the day of certifica-
tion itself. Docking and Dowen (1999) find that small
firms in the United States experienced positive stock
market reaction to the announcement of their first
ISO 9000 certification, but that larger firms’ stock
price did not respond. Simmons and White (1999) find
that ISO 9000 certification is associated with superior
financial performance in the United States within SIC
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code 36 (electronic and other electrical equipment and
components, except computer equipment), but have
insufficient longitudinal data to indicate the direc-
tion of causality. Heras et al. (2002) find that more
profitable firms in the Basque region are more likely
to seek ISO 9000 certification, but that they do not
become more profitable as a result. By using the much
larger U.S. database, focusing on long-term operating
performance, and matching firms based on precertifi-
cation performance, we are able to detect significant
and persistent effects of certification.
3. Theory Development and
Hypotheses
Our theoretical basis is analogous to that commonly
found in the TQM literature, for instance in Hendricks
and Singhal (1997) and Easton and Jarrell (1998). The
starting point is the hypothesis that ISO 9000 certifi-
cation has a positive effect on profitability, regardless
of the underlying mechanism, where profitability is
commonly measured by return on assets (ROA: oper-
ating income/assets) or return on sales (ROS: operat-
ing income/sales), both before depreciation.
Hypothesis 1. ISO 9000 certification leads to an
increase in return on assets (ROA) and in return on sales
(ROS).
A corollary of this hypothesis is that certification
contributes to the stock market’s valuation of a firm’s
intangible assets, measured by Tobin’s Q; a firm with
the same physical assets but “better management”
should have a higher market valuation. Tobin’s Q is
defined as “the ratio of the market value of the out-
standing financial claims on the firm to the current
replacement cost of the firm’s assets” (Lewellen and
Badrinath 1997, p. 78), and measures the alternative-
use value of the firm’s assets. For the horizon we con-
sider here, Tobin’s Q can also be thought of as a proxy
for stock price movement.
Hypothesis 2. ISO 9000 certification leads to an
increase in Tobin’s Q.
Exactly how is ISO 9000 certification linked to
a firm’s financial performance? The academic and
practitioner literatures propose several possible links.
ISO 9000 may improve a firm’s internal procedures,
and hence enhance performance by reducing cost.
Alternatively, ISO 9000 certification may help a firm
retain or increase market share, and hence improve
performance by increasing sales or revenues.
3.1. Productivity Model: ISO 9000 Leads to
Internal Improvements
Implementing ISO 9000 forces significant discipline
on the firm: it has to design procedures to ensure
quality is constantly measured, procedures to ensure
appropriate corrective action is taken whenever
defects occur, etc. As a result, defect rates should
decrease and defects should be caught earlier allow-
ing them to be corrected at lower cost. This discipline
can also identify current practices that are obsolete
or counterproductive. The procedures must be suf-
ficiently well defined that they can be documented.
Once documented, they become easier to transfer to
new employees, so the firm becomes less dependent
on tacit knowledge residing in individual employ-
ees (Mukherjee et al. 1998). Elmuti and Kathawala
(1997) report that ISO 9000 increases productivity by
improving employee morale. Through all of these
mechanisms, manufacturing costs should decrease
when a firm starts implementing ISO 9000. We use
cost of goods sold divided by sales (COGS/SALES)
to measure such improvements in manufacturing
productivity.
Hypothesis 3. ISO 9000 certification leads to lower
COGS/SALES ratios.
A broader view of a firm’s overall productiv-
ity includes customer service processes, the cost
of the certification, etc., which fall under selling,
general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses. We
do not report the broader cost measure (COGS +
SG&A)/SALES separately because it is linked to ROS
through 1− (COGS+ SG&A)/SALES.
3.2. Market Model: ISO 9000 Leads to
Market Benefits
How does ISO 9000 certification help in the mar-
ket? Certification may increase the likelihood of win-
ning a contract, or it may even be a requirement.
Alternatively, certification may help firms to reduce
price pressure. In both cases, the value of sales would
increase. This could occur after certification, though
the improved procedures implemented prior to cer-
tification could also already positively impact sales.
Hence, we use relative growth in SALES, defined by
SALESt − SALESt−1/SALESt−1, as one of our exter-
nal performance measures. To determine whether
sales growth reflects firm growth or faster asset
turnover, we also consider SALES/ASSETS, follow-
ing Hendricks and Singhal (1997) and Easton and
Jarrell (1998).
Hypothesis 4. ISO 9000 certification leads to higher
relative SALES growth and to increased asset turnover
(SALES/ASSETS).
4. Data
This study is based on two large data sets. World Pre-
ferred kindly shared their database (then known as
the Globus Registry) of ISO 9000 certifications in the
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United States through 1997, a total of 21,482 certifica-
tions in all SIC codes at that time. This database listed
the name and address of the certified site, the parent
company, primary and secondary SIC code, and date
of certification. World Preferred is the most widely
used source of information on ISO 9000 certification
activity in the United States (perhaps jointly with
McGraw-Hill). Although we are not aware of inaccu-
racies in the World Preferred Registry, we address the
consequences of possible errors below.
Firms can have multiple certifications, even within
one site, while financial performance is measured at
the corporate level; there exists no way of measuring
financial performance of that part of a company that
falls within the scope of a given ISO 9000 certification.
Therefore, following Docking and Dowen (1999) and
Simmons and White (1999), we focus on a firm’s first
certification, as the effects of certification (if any) will
begin to show around that time. For small firms with
a single site, the disconnect between site-level certi-
fications and firm-level performance is not a major
concern, while for large firms with many sites, this
disconnect makes our tests more conservative: if the
sample contains many multisite firms with only one
certified site, any effects of certification must be strong
in order to be detected. We return to this point in our
discussion of the limitations of this study.
Our first certification occurred in 1990, so we used
Compustat Annual Industrial File data for 1987–1997.
Merging the two databases was a major challenge, as
no unique company identifier was listed in both. We
used several methods to merge them: in some easy
instances, the parent company name and SIC code
in the certification database matched the name and
SIC code of a company listed in Compustat. In many
cases, companies with similar but nonidentical names
appeared in both databases; we used several auto-
mated procedures to identify such possible matches
and verified them manually, using various resources
such as Hoover’s Online, Google, company websites,
SEC disclosures, etc. In all other cases, we verified
whether a site or parent company listed in the cer-
tification database was in fact a subsidiary of a dif-
ferently named company in Compustat. Sites with
ISO 9000 certification for which none of these proce-
dures yielded a match in Compustat were discarded;
these are likely to be foreign owned or privately held,
and hence not listed in Compustat. We started with
21,482 certified sites; for 7,598 of these, we identi-
fied matching firms in Compustat, which suggests
that approximately 35.4% of certified sites belong to
publicly traded firms. This percentage corresponds
closely to that in a recent survey of ISO 9000 and ISO
14000 certified sites in the United States (see Corbett
2004), where 67% of 933 respondents reported being
foreign owned or privately held.
Altogether, merging the data took over two years.
Given the scope and the manual nature of the work
involved, two types of errors are theoretically possi-
ble: firms that did receive certification in 1990–1997
may be listed as noncertified in our final data set,
and firms that did not receive certification may erro-
neously be listed as certified. In a random sample of
100 firms, we found only one firm listed as noncer-
tified for which we were eventually able to identify
a certification, and no instances of firms incorrectly
labeled as certified. The latter type of error is indeed
highly unlikely, as we only mark Compustat firms
as certified if we have a positive match. Incorrectly
labeling a Compustat firm as noncertified could occur
more easily, but this would only make our tests more
conservative, as long as the reliability of the match-
ing is not correlated with the interaction between
ISO 9000 certification and financial performance. If we
treat some certified firms as noncertified, but still find
a significant effect (as we do), we would most likely
underestimate its significance. Moreover, given the
very low error rate we detected, any such effects are
likely to be minimal.
Another potential source of errors lies in the World
Preferred Registry itself, though there are reasons
to believe the database is accurate. World Preferred
receives certification information directly from the
registrars responsible. Registrars and World Preferred
would clearly want to avoid listing certifications that
have not been awarded. Conversely, one use of the
World Preferred Registry is to determine the mar-
ket share of registrars operating in the United States;
therefore, registrars will want the World Preferred
Registry to contain all certifications for which they are
responsible, as otherwise their market share would be
underestimated. Similarly, individual firms will want
their certification to be appropriately listed. Even if
some certifications are not included in the database,
this would again make our tests more conservative.
We focused on manufacturing firms, i.e., all firms
with SIC codes 2000–3999. In most instances, we selec-
ted control firms using two-digit SIC codes because
of the higher proportion of discrepancies in three- or
four-digit SIC codes (Guenther and Rosman 1994) and
because the sample size otherwise shrinks rapidly. We
did separate SIC code 357 (computer equipment) from
the other sectors within SIC code 35 (industrial and
commercial machinery, which includes engines and
turbines, farm and garden machinery and equipment,
etc.) as it is far more high-tech in nature and suffi-
ciently large to treat separately.
Of the 7,238 firms listed in Compustat with SIC
codes 2000–3999, 1,103 firms received at least one
ISO 9000 certification during 1990–1997. We elim-
inated 310 observations with insufficient financial
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information. We then matched each firm to a con-
trol firm or portfolio based on precertification ROA,
assets, or both (as well as industry); if no suitable con-
trol firm existed for any one of the matching criteria,
the observation was discarded. This was done to keep
the sample constant under different matching meth-
ods, in order to avoid our comparisons being con-
taminated by sample effects. After that, we trimmed
the data (following Barber and Lyon 1996), eliminat-
ing a further one to two outliers at each tail of the
population. After trimming, we have 554 firms for
which control firms exist under all matching criteria.
Tables 1a and 1b give descriptive statistics for our
sample.
Measuring Tobin’s Q is not unambiguous; Chung
and Pruitt (1994) propose approximating Tobin’s Q
by (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA, where MVE is market
value of equity, PS the liquidating value of the firm’s
outstanding preferred stock, DEBT the value of the
Table 1a Summary Statistics for Certified and Control Firms Using
One-to-One Matching by Industry Combined with ROA and/or
ASSETS (Year t − 2)
N Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max.
Certified firms
TOTAL ASSETSa 554 162932 21882 571709 157 7429300
SALESa 554 164911 25277 554670 343 7955700
ROAb 554 1572 1526 812 −3308 6069
ROSb 554 1328 1252 830 −6044 5293
Tobin’s Qc 501 151 104 149 010 1425
COGS/SALESb 554 6303 6545 1572 1757 9480
SALES/ASSETSb 554 12740 12162 4542 1834 39547
Control firms matched by industry ROA and ASSETS 
TOTAL ASSETSa 554 166283 19710 626639 132 8634300
SALESa 554 174933 26684 709730 170 11049600
ROAb 554 1566 1516 803 −3214 5816
ROSb 554 1330 1252 1565 −29566 4853
Tobin’s Qc 449 150 118 122 −083 1158
COGS/SALESb 554 6367 6648 1698 1293 14736
SALES/ASSETSb 554 12708 11865 5420 1087 38225
Control firms matched by industry ROA 
TOTAL ASSETSa 554 168139 7171 974992 023 12130770
SALESa 554 157776 9627 895379 027 11857160
ROAb 554 1571 1531 812 −3214 6282
ROSb 554 1281 1238 1566 −29566 4267
Tobin’s Qc 438 158 114 141 −007 1158
COGS/SALESb 554 6286 6421 1730 891 14736
SALES/ASSETSb 554 13308 12434 5988 1087 45615
Control firms matched by industry ASSETS 
TOTAL ASSETSa 554 164390 21876 627525 148 8528000
SALESa 554 158892 25420 575514 125 7839400
ROAb 554 1273 1280 1055 −3289 5879
ROSb 554 931 1115 2501 −33440 4810
Tobin’s Qc 457 137 100 113 −051 936
COGS/SALESb 554 6333 6572 1810 1038 16275
SALES/ASSETSb 554 11961 11423 5362 202 37206
aTOTAL ASSETS and SALES are in millions of dollars.
bROA, ROS, COGS/SALES, and SALES/ASSETS are expressed in percent-
ages.
cTobin’s Q is a dimensionless measure.
Table 1b Summary Statistics for Certified and Control Firms Using
Portfolio Matching by Industry Combined with ROA and/or
ASSETS (Year t − 2)
N Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max.
Certified firms
TOTAL ASSETSa 554 162932 21882 571709 157 7429300
SALESa 554 164911 25277 554670 343 7955700
ROAb 554 1572 1526 812 −3308 6069
ROSb 554 1328 1252 830 −6044 5293
Tobin’s Qc 501 151 104 149 010 1425
COGS/SALESb 554 6303 6545 1572 1757 9480
SALES/ASSETSb 554 12740 12162 4542 1834 39547
Control firms matched by industry ROA and ASSETS 
TOTAL ASSETSa 554 169009 20072 611332 221 8634300
SALESa 554 177013 25416 694121 224 11049600
ROAb 554 1554 1515 791 −3138 5816
ROSb 554 1386 1327 960 −11514 5368
Tobin’s Qc 515 149 128 098 −083 562
COGS/SALESb 554 6346 6306 1371 1293 14548
SALES/ASSETSb 554 12576 12131 4449 2099 38222
Control firms matched by industry ROA 
TOTAL ASSETSa 554 171334 28953 451950 783 5067463
SALESa 554 172015 33071 475046 536 5318035
ROAb 554 1566 1535 802 −3275 6049
ROSb 554 1269 1304 872 −13612 3272
Tobin’s Qc 548 157 135 098 011 790
COGS/SALESb 554 6237 6193 1003 3252 9162
SALES/ASSETSb 554 13759 13569 2833 4750 25052
Control firms matched by industry ASSETS 
TOTAL ASSETSa 554 167987 21217 580656 216 6598554
SALESa 554 165642 25487 574450 264 6824178
ROAb 554 1058 1140 701 −4809 2407
ROSb 554 133 973 3381 −30228 2622
Tobin’s Qc 554 143 131 073 012 482
COGS/SALESb 554 7065 6716 2721 3576 33528
SALES/ASSETSb 554 11782 12169 2546 5511 24246
aTOTAL ASSETS and SALES are in millions of dollars.
bROA, ROS, COGS/SALES, and SALES/ASSETS are expressed in percent-
ages.
cTobin’s Q is a dimensionless measure.
firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets
plus the book value of long-term debt, and TA the
book value of total assets of the firm. Adams (1999)
uses this same formula in his New Zealand study of
adoption of ISO 9000, and King and Lenox (2002) use
the same in their study of financial effects of various
types of pollution reduction.
5. Methodology and Results
The ideal approach to test our hypotheses would be
to formulate a panel data model (see, for instance,
Hsiao 1993), explaining ROA in terms of certification
and several control variables. A major challenge is
that the certification variable is discrete and endoge-
nous. A common approach to drawing causal infer-
ences from nonexperimental data is Heckman’s (1978)
two-stage method, which first predicts the probability
that a firm will seek ISO 9000 certification, based on
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its characteristics, and then uses the predicted prob-
ability as independent variable in the second stage.
In our case, this method has several drawbacks. First,
there exists no single generally accepted extension of
this approach to a panel data context, and the results
we obtained were highly sensitive to the exact model
specification employed. Second, with all specifications
we tried, the predicted certification probabilities in the
first stage were very poor predictors of actual certifi-
cation, which further reduced our confidence in this
approach with this particular data set. A full analysis
of this panel data set would require maximum likeli-
hood estimation with several different distributional
assumptions to examine sensitivity of the results; this
is left for future research.
For these reasons, we revert to event-study meth-
ods. We largely follow the approach for detecting
abnormal operating performance outlined in Barber
and Lyon (1996). An event study requires specify-
ing the event period—in our case, the period during
which ISO 9000 is implemented. A typical implemen-
tation takes anywhere between 6 and 18 months, so
we define our event period as the year in which the
certification was received (year t) and the year imme-
diately preceding certification (year t− 1). The period
preceding the event period (year t − 2) is used for
determining the control group. The three years fol-
lowing the event period (years t+1 through t+3) are
used to test for abnormal performance.
Barber and Lyon (1996) discuss three key choices
in designing an event study. First, the selection of
a measure of operating performance: they find that
operating income divided by assets, or ROA is the
preferred measure (compared to other similar mea-
sures of profitability). We report results on ROA and
ROS. The second decision is to specify a firm’s pre-
dicted performance in the absence of the event. This
is generally done by comparing the certified firms’
postevent performance with a control group of one
or more firms, normally drawn from the same indus-
try (two-digit SIC code), that did not experience the
event. Barber and Lyon (1996) show that selecting a
control group with similar pre-event performance to
the certified firm drastically increases the power of
the study, especially when the certified firms already
have higher pre-event performance, as is the case with
ISO 9000. Lie (2001) confirms that matching by ROA
is appropriate in this case.
Although Barber and Lyon (1996) find that match-
ing by size in addition to industry and pre-event
performance provides little or no extra benefit, we
report this matching as our main results, given that
our Compustat sample does include small firms listed
on NASDAQ as well as larger firms listed on the
NYSE and other exchanges. The control firm is the
firm in the same industry that is “closest” to the cer-
tified firm in terms of assets and ROA. We trans-
formed assets and ROA in each year into z-scores by
subtracting the industry mean and dividing by the
industry standard deviation for that year; “closest”
was then defined by the smallest Euclidean distance
in the two-dimensional space of z-scores, subject to
the constraint that the control firm’s ROA had to lie
between 90% and 110% of the certified firm’s ROA,
and its assets had to lie between 50% and 200% of
the certified firm’s assets. Barber and Lyon (1996)
used the same range for ROA, but only a 70%–130%
range for assets; we expanded the range in response
to a reviewer’s suggestion, as this reduces the number
of certified firms for which no match can be found.
Expanding the matching range further, for instance
to a factor three from the certified firm’s assets, as
Hendricks and Singhal (1997) do, yielded very few
additional observations in our case. Many other stud-
ies, including Hendricks and Singhal (1997), select
control firms based on industry and size alone; we
report those results too, as well as results based on
matching by industry and performance alone. The
control group can consist of a single closely matching
firm, as in Hendricks and Singhal (1997), or of a port-
folio of closely matching firms, as in Barber and Lyon
(1996); we report results using both methods. Con-
trol portfolios consist of all firms that meet the above
matching criteria, rather than just the closest match.
There is no unique best way to choose a control
sample. Another matching method uses propensity
scores, but Smith and Todd (2005) find that the evi-
dence to date about its superior performance is ques-
tionable. The control firms should be as similar as
possible to the firms receiving ISO 9000 certification,
so matching on multiple dimensions is preferred; this
is why the matching by industry, ROA, and ASSETS
provides our main results.
Expected performance EPi	 
	 l of firm i in any
period 
 + l, using period 
 as base period, is given
by EPi	 
	 l= Pi	
 + P Ii	 
+l − PIi	 
 , where PIi	 
 is the
performance of firm i’s control group in period 
 .
Abnormal performance is then given by APi	 
	 l =
Pi	
+l−EPi	 
	 l, and the event study consists of testing
whether this abnormal performance is significantly
different from zero in the hypothesized direction.
Barber and Lyon’s (1996) third finding is that, in
their study, nonparametric tests are more powerful
than parametric (t-) tests. The choice of a test statis-
tic depends on the distribution of abnormal per-
formance; in our case, the Shapiro-Wilk test always
rejected the hypothesis that abnormal performance
was normally distributed with p-values below 0.01,
indicating that nonparametric tests are called for.
When the distribution is symmetric we can use the
Corbett et al.: The Financial Impact of ISO 9000 Certification in the United States
1052 Management Science 51(7), pp. 1046–1059, © 2005 INFORMS
Wilcoxon signed-rank test; in other cases, the distri-
bution is highly skewed so we use the less powerful
sign test (Conover 1999). For completeness, we report
all three statistics.
We can now test the hypotheses by examining
whether certified firms experience abnormal perfor-
mance in terms of ROA, ROS, Tobin’s Q, COGS/
SALES, SALES, and SALES/ASSETS, respectively.
Tables 2–7 show the results for ROA using all six
matching criteria. Tables 8–12 show the results for
the remaining performance measures, using one-to-
one matching by industry, ROA, and size. Table 13
summarizes the results for ROA across all six match-
ing methods. The full results are available in a sep-
arate document. For each test, we report the sample
size under “N .” The next two columns report the
Table 2 Abnormal Performance in ROA; One-to-One Matching, by
Industry, ROA, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year Na meanb medianb skc (t-test)d (WSR test)d (sign test)d
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 0742 0423 00695∗ 00595∗ 00745∗
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 0620 0124 00824
∗ 00766∗ 02220
t − 1
to t
554 1508 0584 s 00075∗∗ 00017∗∗∗ 00167∗∗
t to
t + 1 363 −0288 −0246 06913 07809 07847
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 0417 0469 02219 01151 00839
∗
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 −0525 0108 07594 06171 04345
t − 2
to t
554 2128 0996 00009∗∗∗ 00002∗∗∗ 00097∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 1911 1035 00014
∗∗ 00006∗∗∗ 00090∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 3183 2437 00001
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 3936 2575 s 00001
∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00008∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 1343 0953 00177
∗∗ 00296∗∗ 00090∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 2230 2597 00040
∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 3575 3371 s 00010
∗∗∗ 00002∗∗∗ 00158∗∗
∗p < 01; ∗∗p < 005; ∗∗∗p < 001. In all cases, the hypothesis of nor-
mally distributed abnormal performance was rejected by the Shapiro-Wilk
test with p-values below 1%, so the t-test is never appropriate, but reported
for completeness; if the skewness is substantial the sign test is appropriate,
otherwise one can use the WSR test.
a“N” indicates total number of certified firms in the corresponding sample.
bAP mean and median indicate the mean and median abnormal
performance.
cAn “s” in column “sk” indicates that the absolute value of the skewness
is greater than one.
dThe p-values shown are those for the one-sided test of the null hypothesis
of no abnormal performance, using a t-test, Wilcoxon signed rank test, and
sign test respectively.
Table 3 Abnormal Performance in ROA; Portfolio Matching, by
Industry, ROA, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 −00173 0.0000 05161 04905 05000
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 08906 0.9124 00102
∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00002∗∗∗
t − 1
to t
554 16709 1.3656 s 00018∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t to
t + 1 363 02498 0.3803 03197 00990
∗ 00944∗
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 05664 0.3695 00813
∗ 00738∗ 01624
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 00851 0.6468 04519 03445 01241
t − 2
to t
554 25615 1.6100 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 28874 1.8706 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 37216 1.9982 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 41047 2.9681 s 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 23241 1.6970 s 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 29311 2.1526 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 35600 2.9978 s 00003∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00103∗∗
Table 4 Abnormal Performance in ROA; One-to-One Matching, by
Industry, ROA
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 −0926 −0772 09359 09698 09104
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 2666 1301 s 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1
to t
554 2197 0905 00005∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00042∗∗∗
t to
t + 1 363 0978 0028 s 00884
∗ 02114 03964
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 −0585 0171 s 07070 08539 03230
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 1701 0444 00750
∗ 00619∗ 00346∗∗
t − 2
to t
554 4863 2620 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 5633 2824 s 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 5714 2688 s 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 8976 3751 s 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00040∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 3424 1364 00004
∗∗∗ 00002∗∗∗ 00118∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 3166 2172 00123
∗∗ 00013∗∗∗ 00035∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 6965 4604 00006∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00065∗∗∗
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Table 5 Abnormal Performance in ROA; Portfolio Matching, by
Industry, ROA
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 −1338 −1304 09998 10000 10000
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 2314 2377 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1
to t
554 1395 1710 s 00004∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t to
t + 1 363 0552 0573 s 01303 00219
∗∗ 00293∗∗
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 0936 0945 00108
∗∗ 00035∗∗∗ 00179∗∗
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 0888 1179 00328
∗∗ 00048∗∗∗ 00008∗∗∗
t − 2
to t
554 3709 3550 s 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 4577 3934 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 5760 4458 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 7039 5037 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 2438 2543 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 3632 3504 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 5280 4353 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
Table 6 Abnormal Performance in ROA; One-to-One Matching, by
Industry, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 0530 0559 01542 01026 00896∗
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 0232 0073 02997 04058 03353
t − 1
to t
554 0561 0097 01710 04231 04325
t to
t + 1 363 1029 0315 s 00866
∗ 02375 03181
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 −0709 0384 08817 04644 02351
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 2766 0800 s 00025
∗∗∗ 00112∗∗ 00103∗∗
t − 2
to t
554 0794 −0151 01307 03626 07380
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 2026 −0533 s 00204
∗∗ 02535 07847
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 1847 2300 00255
∗∗ 00208∗∗ 00654∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 5825 3610 s 00001
∗∗∗ 00002∗∗∗ 00005∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 1850 0150 s 00159
∗∗ 02526 03565
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 1384 1097 00578
∗ 00407∗∗ 00283∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 5021 2264 s 00005∗∗∗ 00026∗∗∗ 00158∗∗
Table 7 Abnormal Performance in ROA; Portfolio Matching, by
Industry, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 08539 09685 00103∗∗ 00021∗∗∗ 00019∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 05841 06719 00385
∗∗ 00006∗∗∗ 00029∗∗∗
t − 1
to t
554 02966 04386 02204 00148∗∗ 00804∗
t to
t + 1 363 01412 01225 s 03735 03820 03373
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 03289 06346 01481 00295
∗∗ 00578∗
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 06515 10701 00727
∗ 00204∗∗ 00103∗∗
t − 2
to t
554 08807 11045 s 00251∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00009∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 07244 03369 00605
∗ 00353∗∗ 01241
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 13506 11356 00047
∗∗∗ 00035∗∗∗ 00179∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 23401 11860 00005
∗∗∗ 00018∗∗∗ 00494∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 05884 04219 00812
∗ 00906∗ 01469
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 10446 09561 00129
∗∗ 00039∗∗∗ 00019∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 21729 22921 00007∗∗∗ 00007∗∗∗ 00040∗∗∗
Table 8 Abnormal Performance in ROS; One-to-One Matching, by
Industry, ROA, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 0266 0024 02340 03584 04603
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 0442 0347 s 02113 00097
∗∗∗ 00306∗∗
t − 1
to t
554 1074 0255 00053∗∗∗ 00030∗∗∗ 00252∗∗
t to
t + 1 363 0201 −0058 03199 04565 06036
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 0887 0604 s 00579
∗∗ 00910∗ 00208∗∗
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 −0177 0245 06121 03175 03396
t − 2
to t
554 1516 0973 s 00034∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00022∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 2024 0810 00003
∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00155∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 3343 1792 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00004∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 4121 2788 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 1161 0498 00114
∗∗ 00081∗∗∗ 00201∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 2161 1682 00026
∗∗∗ 00002∗∗∗ 00004∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 3275 2069 00002∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
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Table 9 Abnormal Performance in Tobin’s Q; One-to-One Matching, by
Industry, ROA, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
282 0031 −0002 03321 07853 05711
t − 2 to
t − 1 406 0083 0052 00973
∗ 00211∗∗ 00368∗∗
t − 1
to t
468 0097 0065 00315∗∗ 00089∗∗∗ 00080∗∗∗
t to
t + 1 315 −0020 0018 06295 04997 01987
t + 1 to
t + 2 200 −0076 −0003 08763 04930 07146
t + 2 to
t + 3 126 −0122 −0067 09792 09606 09634
t − 2
to t
405 0186 0179 00069∗∗∗ 00002∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 1 256 0167 0209 00248
∗∗ 00011∗∗∗ 00003∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 2 160 0212 0200 00375
∗∗ 00015∗∗∗ 00034∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 102 0195 0179 00436
∗∗ 00308∗∗ 00364∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 298 0057 0057 02176 01279 00656
∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 182 0061 0090 s 02870 00208
∗∗ 00265∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 116 0149 0164 00738∗ 00221∗∗ 00124∗∗
Table 10 Abnormal Performance in COGS/SALES; One-to-One
Matching, by Industry, ROA, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 −0432 −0217 s 01155 01140 00970∗
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 −0215 −0398 s 02566 00191
∗∗ 00067∗∗∗
t − 1
to t
554 −0812 −0242 s 00055∗∗∗ 00253∗∗ 00625∗
t to
t + 1 363 −0240 −0299 02011 01052 00413
∗∗
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 −0848 −0404 s 00367
∗∗ 01380 00654∗
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 0349 0444 07561 07076 08928
t − 2
to t
554 −1027 −0533 00037∗∗∗ 00088∗∗∗ 00107∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 −1328 −1143 00024
∗∗∗ 00006∗∗∗ 00067∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 −2503 −1559 00002
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 −3283 −2129 00000
∗∗∗ 00000∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 −0890 −0592 00135
∗∗ 00077∗∗∗ 00779∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 −1803 −1163 00026
∗∗∗ 00010∗∗∗ 00006∗∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 −2348 −1460 00014∗∗∗ 00006∗∗∗ 00065∗∗∗
Table 11 Abnormal Relative SALES Growth; One-to-One Matching, by
Industry, ROA, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 −0023 −0011 08829 09858 08847
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 0010 −0018 02976 08068 09427
t − 1
to t
554 0037 0014 00049∗∗∗ 00119∗∗ 00625∗
t to
t + 1 363 0049 0015 00071
∗∗∗ 00082∗∗∗ 00460∗∗
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 0006 0019 04056 01911 01785
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 0044 0034 00225
∗∗ 00347∗∗ 00673∗
t − 2
to t
554 0070 0000 00303∗∗ 02785 05000
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 0091 0031 00965
∗ 00301∗∗ 01342
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 0118 0016 01038 01205 03466
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 0220 0049 s 01099 01585 02533
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 0090 0028 00099
∗∗∗ 00018∗∗∗ 00938∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 0116 0049 00291
∗∗ 00280∗∗ 01462
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 0236 0116 s 00192∗∗ 00253∗∗ 00919∗
Notes. “Abnormal relative sales growth” is defined by comparing SALESt −
SALESt−1/SALESt−1 of certified firms with that of the control firms.
mean and median abnormal performance. The first
row reports abnormal performance (AP) in the year
prior to the matching (up to two years before certifica-
tion), i.e., APi	 
	 l with 
 = t− 3 and l= 1. (We discuss
later why this was included.) The second row reports
abnormal performance in the year immediately fol-
lowing the decision to embark on the certification
process—i.e., APi	 
	 l with 
 = t − 2 and l = 1—the
year before the certification is awarded. The third
row measures abnormal performance in the year of
certification, i.e., APi	 
	 l with 
 = t − 1 and l = 1,
etc. The second and third block of results report
longer-term abnormal performance; for instance, the
row “−2 to 0” measures APi	 
	 l with 
 = t − 2 and
l= 2. The column marked “sk” shows an “s” if the
absolute skewness of the distribution of abnormal
performance, defined as the third moment of the
distribution divided by the cube of the standard devi-
ation, is greater than one; Hair et al. (1998) sug-
gest that indicates severe skewness. The next three
columns report the p-values corresponding to para-
metric and nonparametric tests of the hypothesis that
certified firms exhibit superior performance (i.e., pos-
itive abnormal performance for ROA, ROS, Tobin’s Q,
SALES, and SALES/ASSETS and negative abnormal
performance for COGS/SALES).
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Table 12 Abnormal Performance in SALES/ASSETS; One-to-One
Matching, by Industry, ROA, ASSETS
From AP AP p-value p-value p-value
year N mean median sk (t-test) (WSR test) (sign test)
t − 3 to
t − 2
405 2468 0891 00765∗ 01579 01850
t − 2 to
t − 1 554 −2511 −0947 09648 08630 08463
t − 1
to t
554 3486 3472 00039∗∗∗ 00004∗∗∗ 00008∗∗∗
t to
t + 1 363 −1506 −0863 08252 08400 09221
t + 1 to
t + 2 233 −3674 −0555 09672 07120 06770
t + 2 to
t + 3 147 −4926 −2601 09956 09943 09717
t − 2
to t
554 0975 1097 02636 01619 01344
t − 2 to
t + 1 363 −0500 0250 05935 04675 03369
t − 2 to
t + 2 233 −2465 0004 07836 04360 04738
t − 2 to
t + 3 147 −6796 −3309 s 09436 08368 07187
t − 1 to
t + 1 363 2152 2156 01256 01042 00413
∗∗
t − 1 to
t + 2 233 −1198 2428 06666 02602 03230
t − 1 to
t + 3 147 −1833 −2469 06967 04527 07187
6. Discussion and Limitations
6.1. Discussion of Results
In this section, we discuss our main results, after
which we add some notes about interpretation. Table 2
Table 13 Significance of Abnormal Performance in ROA Under All Six Matching Criteria
Industry, ROA, ASSETS Industry, ROA Industry, ASSETS
One-to-one Portfolio One-to-one Portfolio One-to-one Portfolio
From year Na WSRb signb WSRb signb WSRb signb WSRb signb WSRb signb WSRb signb
t − 3 to t − 2 405 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
t − 2 to t − 1 554 ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
t − 1 to t 554 ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
t to t + 1 363 ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
t + 1 to t + 2 233 ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
t + 2 to t + 3 147 ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
t − 2 to t 554 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
t − 2 to t + 1 363 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗
t − 2 to t + 2 233 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗
t − 2 to t + 3 147 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗
t − 1 to t + 1 363 ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗
t − 1 to t + 2 233 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
t − 1 to t + 3 147 ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
∗p < 01; ∗∗p < 005; ∗∗∗p < 001.
a“N” indicates total number of certified firms in the corresponding sample.
bThe significance levels shown are those for the one-sided test of the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance, using the
Wilcoxon signed rank test and sign test, respectively.
shows that when selecting single control firms based
on industry, ROA, and size, firms experienced sig-
nificant abnormal improvements in ROA in the year
of their first ISO 9000 certification. Using the sign
test, the most conservative of the three, abnormal
performance for t − 1 to t, the year leading up to
certification, is weakly significant p = 00167. After
certification, no further abnormal improvements in
ROA occur. The cumulative improvements, however,
appear to be strong and lasting, as all the longer-
term tests, using either t − 2 or t − 1 as base period,
show significant abnormal improvements in ROA,
usually with p-values below 0.01. The magnitude of
the longer-term effects is considerable, in the order
of 1–4 percentage points. Starting with an ROA of
15.7% (the mean of certified firms in year t− 2, from
Table 1a), the mean abnormal increase in ROA by year
t+ 3 is 3.94 percentage points (Table 2), compared to
noncertified firms starting with the same ROA, which
corresponds to a relative increase of 25%.
Tables 3–5 show that matching by industry and
ROA alone, and/or using portfolios of control firms,
has little effect on the long-term results, although the
pure performance-matched sample exhibits a level of
abnormal performance that is almost twice as high.
The short-term effects do become much stronger in
all three cases, in the year of certification (t − 1 to t)
and now also in the preceding year (t − 2 to t − 1).
Matching by size alone using portfolios of control
firms also leads to similar results, as shown in Table 7.
However, one-to-one matching based on size alone
(Table 6) makes the short-term effects disappear; even
there, though, the long-term effects remain strong.
We discuss the difference between the methods later.
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Table 13 summarizes the results for ROA across all
six matching methods.
These results are very closely mirrored using ROS
as performance measure, as shown in Table 8 for
the one-to-one performance- and size-matched sam-
ple. Moving to Tobin’s Q, in Table 9, we find a largely
similar pattern, with the notable difference that the
long-term effects are not as persistent across matching
methods as is the case for ROA (see Tables A14–A19
in the online appendix, available at http://mansci.
pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html).
What drives the improvement in ROA? Immedi-
ately after deciding to seek certification, firms ex-
perience a significant abnormal productivity imp-
rovement, as witnessed by the drop in COGS/SALES
in Table 10, which is maintained over all the longer-
horizon tests. Certified firms on average see COGS/
SALES decrease by 3.28 percentage points more than
noncertified firms by year t + 3 (Table 10), a relative
improvement of 5% from the mean COGS/SALES
ratio in t− 2 of 63% (Table 1a). Table 11 shows a tem-
porary weakly significant abnormal boost in SALES
growth, mainly in the years immediately before and
after certification. The mean (and median) magni-
tude of abnormal sales growth continues to increase
for longer horizons but becomes less significant.
Table 12 shows a significant abnormal increase in
SALES/ASSETS in the year of certification, but no
long-term effects because the certified firms’ assets
also grew faster than those of noncertified firms.
The magnitude of long-term abnormal performance
in SALES/ASSETS can be both positive or negative
depending on the matching method, but it is signif-
icant (and positive) only for the pure performance-
matched sample using control portfolios (see Tables
A32–A37 in the online appendix). Certification is asso-
ciated with faster growth, but does not increase firms’
sales relative to their asset base. To summarize, firms’
first ISO 9000 certification did lead to improvements
in ROA, primarily through increased productivity.
These findings are largely consistent with those in
Hendricks and Singhal (1997) for TQM. How should
one interpret our results? Strictly speaking, they show
that firms experience significantly better relative per-
formance, after deciding to seek their first ISO 9000
certification, than control firms with similar assets and
performance prior to that decision. This strongly sug-
gests that after deciding to seek their first ISO 9000
certification, firms made changes that led to improve-
ments in ROA through increased productivity. Closer
examination of certified firms’ performance over time
suggests that in many cases, certified firms see only a
minor increase in ROA compared to year t− 2 levels,
while noncertified firms see substantial declines. This
would mean that ISO 9000 is a qualifying criterion, in
Hill’s (1993) terms, rather than an order-winning cri-
terion. It helps firms to maintain, rather than increase,
profitability. This is no surprise: it is hard to see how
firms could derive sustainable competitive advantage
from a public standard like ISO 9000. However, as
incomplete availability of financial data causes the
sample to shrink for longer horizons, we need to exer-
cise caution in interpreting this observation.
Are these improvements a direct causal effect of
deciding to seek ISO 9000? Certainly, it is possible that
the decision to seek ISO 9000 is associated with other
“good management” practices, and that it is these lat-
ter practices that improve ROA rather than the ISO
9000 certification process itself. However, the control
groups do consist of firms with the same prior perfor-
mance, so something changed at the certified firms in
the two years before the actual certification. In light
of the magnitude of the effects, it seems likely that
factors other than ISO 9000 certification contributed,
but given the design of the study, these findings do
indicate that the preparations for the first ISO 9000
certification also contributed to superior performance.
We explore various alternative explanations below.
6.2. Effect of Matching Method and Discussion of
Alternative Explanations
The results for abnormal performance in ROA using
all six different matching criteria are summarized in
Table 13; Tables A38–A43 in the online appendix do
the same for all performance measures. When we
match by ROA only, the magnitudes and significance
of abnormal performance are the largest. Matching
by size in addition to ROA leads to a decrease
in magnitude and significance, but no noteworthy
change. However, matching only by size, the short-
term effects disappear under one-to-one matching
(but not under portfolio matching) and the long-term
effects become weaker. This is consistent with Barber
and Lyon’s (1996) finding that performance matching
increases the power of the study and that matching
by size is unimportant compared to performance-
matching (p. 385), and with Hendricks and Singhal’s
(1997, p. 1265) report that matching by size has little
impact on industry-matched results.
Although these results are quite strong in them-
selves, two alternative explanations still need to be
addressed. The first is the possibility that the sample
firms were already increasing their ROA relative to
the control firms, even before deciding to seek ISO
9000 certification. If this were true, one would find
positive abnormal performance in the period t− 3 to
t− 2. One of the six matching methods (size-matched
control portfolios) shows significant positive abnor-
mal performance for t − 3 to t− 2. Two others (size-
and ROA-matched control firms, and size-matched
control firms) show weakly significant abnormal
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performance p < 01; in the first of these, the postcer-
tification abnormal performance is much larger and
more significant. The two ROA-matched samples
(one-to-one and portfolios) both show strongly nega-
tive abnormal performance prior to matching. From
this we conclude that the non-performance-matched
samples display only a minimal tendency towards
positive abnormal performance prior to the certifica-
tion decision, and that this effect is too small and
inconsistent to fully explain the longer-term abnormal
performance observed after ISO 9000 certification.
Another potential alternative explanation for our
results could be that the performance matching
induces an artificially positive abnormal performance
by reversion to the mean in operating performance
measures. Firms that decide to seek ISO 9000 certi-
fication already have a higher ROA prior to the cer-
tification decision (as shown in Tables 1a and 1b),
so requiring control firms to have equally high
prior performance may lead to selecting noncertify-
ing firms with uncharacteristically high performance
in the year of the matching, but lower performance
before and after. If this were true, the control firms
should display positive abnormal performance over
the period t− 3 to t− 2, prior to the matching, mean-
ing that the sample firms should display an equiva-
lent negative abnormal performance over that same
period. The two ROA-matched samples do display
this effect; however, the sample firms’ negative abnor-
mal performance over t − 3 to t − 2 is considerably
smaller than the positive abnormal performance in
each of the following two periods. Matching by size
as well as ROA eliminates this effect. This suggests
that there is some degree of reversion to the mean in
pure ROA-matched samples, but not in the others, so
that this effect is far from sufficient to explain the pos-
itive abnormal performance associated with ISO 9000
certification.
An event study can never rule out other sources of
unobserved heterogeneity, and indeed, we know that
firms that will decide to seek ISO 9000 certification
already perform better than those that will not. The
key question is, is there any unobserved heterogeneity
that affects the impact of ISO 9000 on a firm’s per-
formance? The two tests above indicate that whatever
unobserved heterogeneity is present is insufficient to
fully explain the positive link between abnormal per-
formance and ISO 9000 certification that we find here.
One way to look at these results is to conclude that the
prescriptions contained in ISO 9000 themselves lead
to superior performance. Alternatively, firms may use
the certification procedure as an opportunity for pro-
cess improvement. In the latter view, it is the firm’s
own efforts that lead to superior performance, not the
standard in itself, but these efforts are triggered and
guided by the ISO 9000 certification process. One firm
may have the potential to be more successful than
another, but this potential is turned into reality as a
result of ISO 9000. One could say that some firms
may have a “gene for good management,” but that
this gene is not expressed until ISO 9000 switches it
on. (We are grateful to Paul Kleindorfer for this inter-
pretation.) This latter view could go a long way to
reconciling the apparently conflicting views of those
who believe that ISO 9000 is too minimal a standard
to be able to drive real performance improvements,
and those who are convinced that it does just that. If
a firm lacks the “good management gene,” ISO 9000
may not help them much either. Firms that do have
the potential to be successful may need an external
trigger to unlock that potential; ISO 9000 appears to
be one such trigger.
6.3. Limitations and Future Research
Do our results depend on the degree to which firms
have already adopted TQM? Several interactions are
possible: Firms with a history of TQM may have less
room left for improvements and, hence, reap less ben-
efits from ISO 9000 certification. Conversely, firms
with a TQM program may be able to obtain ISO 9000
certification at lower cost and, hence, reap higher ben-
efits. Evidence on the interaction between ISO 9000
and TQM is scarce, and our study does not address
TQM. The survey by Terziovski et al. (1997) found
no link between ISO 9000 certification and improved
financial performance in Australia and New Zealand,
irrespective of the degree of TQM implementation. To
our knowledge, there is no hard evidence that TQM
facilitates or hinders ISO 9000 certification, or vice
versa, but this needs to be studied further.
What do our results imply for firms outside the
United States? One reviewer suggested that firms
in Europe were quicker to adopt ISO 9000 certifica-
tion, while firms in the United States may have been
quicker to adopt TQM practices; would the effects of
ISO 9000 in Europe be similar to what we found for
the United States? Again, more evidence on interac-
tions between TQM and ISO 9000 would be needed
to determine whether these effects depend on a coun-
try’s prior history with TQM.
There are several other inevitable limitations. First,
given the effort involved in matching the database
of ISO 9000 certifications to Compustat, it was not
possible to include certifications after 1997. In fact,
the ISO 9000 series was thoroughly revised in 2000,
which is likely to introduce a discontinuity in the
effect of certification around 1998–1999, as firms rush
to seek certification before the new, tougher stan-
dard is introduced. It would be interesting to replicate
this study with an even longer time horizon in the
future. Second, the study matches ISO 9000 certifica-
tions, which involve individual sites, with corporate
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financial performance. This is not a major problem as
it makes our tests more conservative, but if reliable
disaggregated performance data on individual sites
become available, it would be worthwhile to repli-
cate this study for individual sites. Third, the study
only includes U.S. manufacturing firms, so the find-
ings need not apply to nonmanufacturing firms or to
non-U.S. firms. Fourth, an event study can never rule
out all alternative explanations. For instance, firms
with higher exports to Europe are more likely to
seek ISO 9000 certification (Anderson et al. 1999). If
purchases by European firms grew faster than those
by firms in the United States and elsewhere, during
the full horizon of our study, U.S. firms exporting
to Europe would presumably exhibit superior per-
formance, which would then be correlated to ISO
9000 certification. However, we are not aware of any
reason to believe that purchases from the United
States by firms in Europe outpaced those by firms
elsewhere during the 1990–1997 period. Moreover, in
many of our tests the initial occurrence of superior
performance coincided in time with the years imme-
diately leading up to each individual firm’s certifi-
cation. Such arguments make it highly unlikely that
such an export-focused or any other analogous expla-
nation is the full story either. Finally, this study has
only included ISO 9000 certifications; it would be
interesting to replicate this study focusing on QS 9000,
ISO 14000, SA 8000, and other comparable current or
proposed process standards.
7. Conclusions
Using event-study methods, we have found that after
deciding to seek their first ISO 9000 certification,
publicly traded manufacturing firms in the United
States experience significant abnormal improvements
in financial performance. We find that the precise tim-
ing and magnitude of the effects vary across differ-
ent control-group specifications, but the longer-term
effects are strongly significant in all cases. The degree
to which the control group specification affects the
short-term results indicates the importance of includ-
ing extensive sensitivity analyses in any event study,
e.g., using several combinations of industry, size,
and pre-event performance as matching criteria, and
using both individual firms and portfolios as control
groups. By using control firms with similar pre-event
size and performance, and by performing extensive
sensitivity analyses, we can largely rule out the alter-
native hypothesis that ISO 9000 has no causal effect
on performance but is simply adopted by firms that
are better managed. Of course, this does not mean
that all firms will reap benefits from ISO 9000 certi-
fication: anecdotal evidence abounds that some firms
implement the standard in a more rigorous and com-
prehensive way than others, and hence are likely to
obtain more benefits. Overall, though, the evidence
presented here does support the view that careful
design and implementation of consistent and docu-
mented quality management systems can contribute
significantly to superior financial performance.
An online appendix to this paper is available at
http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html.
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